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Medicine and the Culture ofCommand:
the Case ofMalaria Control in the British Army
during the two World Wars
MARK HARRISON*
Perhaps more than any other disease, malaria serves as a potent symbol of the struggle
between humankind and the natural world. Scientific and technical advances-from
Ross's identification of the malaria vector to the application of DDT during the Second
World War-have promised much but have so far failed to provide any lasting solution to
the devastation caused by the disease. Yet at the close of the Second World War it was
confidently expected that malaria could be not only controlled but eradicated, since
newly-developed drugs and insecticides had seemingly paved the way for Allied victory
in Italy, South East Asia, and the Far East.
The official histories of the Allied medical services, written in the first decade or so
after 1945, werejustly proud ofthis achievement and celebrated the work ofthe scientists
and medical officers that had effected it. But this triumphalism never entirely obscured a
more critical rendering ofevents, which saw the successes ofmilitary medicine not as the
inevitable outcome ofscientific progress but as a hard-won battle over military ignorance.
The medical officer was portrayed as an heroic figure, battling against "red tape" and
incompetent commanders, whose cause was vindicated by the "victory" over malaria and
ultimately over the Axis Powers.
These histories are free of the distortion and bias which characterizes so many official
histories of the First World War but they are unsatisfactory for a number of reasons.
Firstly, whilst giving credit to "enlightened" military commanders, they still tend to
exaggerate the role of the medical officer vis a' vis his combatant counterpart. They also
exaggerate the military importance of the medical contribution to the war effort which,
though considerable, was less marked than the official histories would have us believe.
Thirdly, they do not attempt any systematic analysis of the relationship between
technological innovation and diffusion in the armed forces. The benefits of new
technologies are seen as self-evident and any reluctance to utilize them as proof of the
ignorance or incompetence of the commanders concerned. Their story is one of "lessons
learnt" and "forgotten", with very little consideration of why these lessons were learnt or
forgotten.
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In this article I aim to elucidate the relationship between technological innovation and
diffusion' in the armed forces by looking at what might be termed "the culture of
command", by which I mean the attitudes, approaches, and styles of leadership that
existed in the British Army and the bearing these had on medical services, with special
reference to the prevention ofmalaria. Although medical innovations-such as DDT and
new anti-malaria drugs-were important, the British Army's relative success against
malaria in the Second World War (by contrast with the First) depended crucially on the
emergence of a new style ofcommand which attached greater importance to medicine as
a managerial resource. The British Army, like sections of industry2 and public
administration,3 had come to view scientific medicine (broadly construed) as a means of
maximizing the potential of manpower. Although occasionally apparent during the First
World War, an appreciation of medicine's utility in "man-management" was not
widespread among British officers and men until after 1939.
This "managerial" ethos was wedded to a new conception ofthe British soldier. Senior
British officers in 1914-18 generally had adim view ofthe ordinary soldier's capacity for
independent action and adhered rigidly to a centralized and hierarchical chain of
command.4 But during the Second World War, a new generation of senior officers,
typified by General William Slim and the Adjutant-General Sir Ronald Adam, came to
stress the value of education in the maintenance of morale and fighting efficiency. The
"citizen-soldier" had a right and a duty to understand where he stood in the scheme of
things. Through the films, leaflets and lectures of the Army Education Corps and the
Central Council for Health Education, the British soldier was encouraged to take
responsibility for his own health and was informed about disease prevention to a far
greater extent than in the First World War.5 These related developments enable us to
explain why the new technologies developed during the Second World War were utilized
to their full potential.
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The First World War
Before 1914 the British Army's campaign against malaria had been less than
successful: it had lost thousands of men to the disease in the Caribbean in the eighteenth
century6 and admissions to hospital from malaria in many colonial garrisons did not
decrease significantly until the turn of the twentieth century.7 Quinine prophylaxis-
which was rumoured to cause sexual impotence-was unpopular with troops and difficult
to enforce in peacetime, let alone on active service. There was also much uncertainty
about the efficacy ofquinine as aprophylactic and concern over its toxic side effects. Nor
had control ofthe mosquito vector-identified by Ronald Ross in 1897-met with much
success in the British colonies. Even in strictly controlled areas, such as the military
cantonment ofMian Mir in India, results had been disappointing and the practicability of
mosquito destruction was hotly contested by advocates ofquinine prophylaxis.8
There were, however, some encouraging signs: as Philip Curtin has shown, malaria
mortality (as opposed to morbidity) in colonial garrisons fell significantly from the mid-
nineteenth century onwards.9 Malaria had also been kept in check on some military
campaigns: during the Third China War of 1860, the British force was said to have
avoided infection by stationing troops in non-malarious areas such as Kowloon;'0 and, in
the Ashanti Wars of 1873-4, it is claimed that Sir Garnet Wolseley instructed his men in
the rudiments ofhygiene and that he made sure that "healthy" areas were chosen for the
campaign."1 British troops were said to have suffered less from malaria than the Ashanti
themselves, although other histories of the campaign present conflicting evidence.12 But
even modest success was the exception rather than the rule: the majority ofcommanding
officers showed little interest in the health of their troops and approached campaigns in
malarious areas with a high degree offatalism.
During the First World War the British Army encountered malaria chiefly in
Macedonia, East Africa, Mesopotamia and Palestine. Malaria was not the only health
hazard met with in these areas but it was certainly one of the most serious, especially in
Macedonia and East Africa. One notable advantage enjoyed by the British Army
compared with previous campaigns was the intelligence provided by malaria surveys. The
malaria survey-an entomological, topographical and meteorological report-had been
developed in India following Ross's identification of the malaria vector.13 After the
outbreak ofwar, many ofthose engaged in mapping malaria in the colonies were seconded
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to the British Army. Among those given temporary commissions in the Royal Army
Medical Corps (RAMC) were Sir Ronald Ross, formerly Professor of Tropical Medicine
at the Liverpool School ofTropical Medicine; Andrew Balfour, Director ofthe Wellcome
Bureau of Scientific Research; and S R Christophers, British India's foremost
malariologist. Balfour was attached to the Medical Advisory Committees of the
Mesopotamian and, later, the Mediterranean Areas;14 Christophers to the Army in
Mesopotamia; and Ross, as Chief Consultant in Malaria, acted as an itinerant adviser.
Using the information gathered in these surveys, campaigns against the insect vector
were conducted in most areas occupied by British forces. In the Sinai Desert, atthe British
base of Kantara, the surrounding countryside was systematically explored and
innumerable ponds were filled in or drained. Where this was not possible, petroleum
spraying of breeding pools was carried out, apparently with good results. But the most
efficient method of destroying larvae was said to be the introduction of larvivorous fish,
a method first tried in India. By the end of 1916 it was claimed (somewhat improbably)
that one seldom saw a mosquito at Kantara.15 Anti-malaria work at Kantara was typical
of that conducted at most British bases but more extensive drainage works were also
carried out in notoriously malarious areas. This was especially true ofparts ofMacedonia,
where the grave danger posed by malaria was immediately recognized by the Director of
Medical Services (DMS) Surgeon-General H R Whitehead when he arrived there in 1915.
Ross also visited later that year and recommended the drainage of marshes along the
Salonika-Monastir road. By 1916 a team of malaria officers had been appointed to take
charge ofthese operations and mosquito brigades busied themselves clearing streams and
destroying larvae-some 1,500 acres of marshland were eventually drained.16
In some areas the military authorities showed considerable enthusiasm for anti-malaria
measures, especially in southern Mesopotamia, where anti-malaria works were linked to
imperialistic ambitions. In 1916, the Medical Advisory Committee, which included the
entomologist Andrew Balfour, reported that:
When we come to consider the possibility of anti-mosquito measures on a large scale we are forced
to recognise that, in order to be effective, these would probably have to be very extensive and
consequently somewhat costly. They will be a necessary corollary of the scheme for land
reclamation and town planning which must be carried into effect if Basra is to become a healthy
British possession.17
Elsewhere drainage operations were less successful, as in the case ofthe Struma Valley-
a malarious area into which British troops began to move in 1917. Extensive drainage
operations were impossible in mountainous terrain, or where the campaign was a highly
mobile one, as in Palestine during 1917-18. The British Expeditionary Force in Palestine
had an enviable reputation for good health, owing to the diligence of its commanding
14 For example: 'The medical entomology of 16 DMS Salonika, '(Secret) Report on the
Salonika', by Temp. Lt Col Andrew Balfour, RAMC incidence of malaria in the Salonika army in 1916;
646, Contemporary Medical Archives Collection, on the measures taken for its prevention; and on the
Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine measures proposed for its prevention during 1917',
(hereafter CMAC). WO 32/5112, PRO.
15 Serjeant-Major R.A.M.C. [pseud.], With the 17 Medical advisory committee, Mesopotamia
R.A.M.C. in Egypt, London, Cassell, 1918, inquiries: report on Basra base, September 1916,
pp. 164-6. Simla, Govt. Press, 1916, p. 15.
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officer General E H Allenby. But in the autumn of 1918 the British pursued the Turks into
the malarious Jordan Valley only to be confronted by propaganda leaflets which warned
them that: "The flies all die in Jericho in July, and the men in August". This was not an
idle threat, and in the weeks leading up to the armistice with Turkey on the 31 October,
almost half the 40,000-strong British force was hospitalized with malaria, much of it of
the falciparum (malignant-tertian) variety.18
Such difficulties were not the only obstacle to malaria prevention. Many commanding
officers were not convinced that much could be achieved by drainage and other such
measures, and refused to divert manpower from tasks which they regarded as more
essential. At a town not far from Salonika, Captain A Cecil Alport, RAMC, was forced to
by-pass his commanding officer and to arrange anti-malaria work through a local major
and the French and Serbian commanders. Having gained their support, he secured POWs,
civilians and French troops for the construction ofa canal to drain the marshes around the
town. By the end of the war much of this land was under cultivation and malaria
admissions had allegedly decreased to negligible proportions.19
Where drainage was not an option, as in mobile campaigns, commanders could always
insist that their troops use some form of personal protection, whether in the form of
mosquito nets or prophylaxis with quinine. But many MOs were still uncertain about the
effectiveness ofquinine prophylaxis. Major C H Tredgold, RAMC, serving in Macedonia,
noticed that some ofthe men in his division who had received quinine had resisted illness
but that many still fell sick.20 Cecil Alport, also serving in Macedonia, was far more
pessimistic: in his opinion quinine prophylaxis had been an "absolute failure" and an
extra-large dose would be required if it were to have any real effect. Alport believed that
it was better to rely upon mosquito nets if possible.2' Most other medical officers in
Macedonia, including the DMS, General Whitehead, were similarly disillusioned with
quinine as a preventive measure. Whitehead reported in 1916 that the results of quinine
prophylaxis had been disappointing and that "very many men have contracted malaria
who had been taking quinine regularly".22
A sub-committee ofthe MRC appointed to look into malaria in Macedoniaendorsed the
opinions ofmedical officers there. The committee reported in January 1917 that there was
"no good evidence that prophylactic quinine has lessened the incidence of malaria".23 It
should be noted that the committee included both partisans of quinine prophylaxis, such
18 'A Mounted Brigade Field Ambulance in peace Gallipoli Peninsula; in Macedonia; in Mesopotamia,
and war-2nd South Midland Mounted Brigade, and north-west Persia; in EastAfrica; in the Aden
1914-19', RAMC 791/5; Maj. Gen. Sir Richard protectorate, and in north Russia. Ambulance
Luce, 'War experiences of a Territorial Medical transport during the war, London, HMSO, 1924,
Officer', pp. 465, 529-30, 534, RAMC 2031; pp. 104-6.
Memorandum on malaria, p. 5, RAMC 2063/34, 20 C H Tredgold, 'The prophylactic use ofquinine
CMAC. in malaria: with special reference to experiences in
19 A Cecil Alport, Malaria and its treatment: in Macedonia', Br med. J., 1918, i: 525-9.
the line and at the base, London, John Bale & 21 Alport, op. cit., note 19 above, p.16.
Danielson, 1919, pp. 17-22, 25; W G MacPherson 22 H R Whitehead, 'Report on the incidence of
and T J Mitchell (eds), History ofthe war based on malaria', WO 32/5112, PRO.
official documents. Medical services general history, 23 'MRC Report on ... malaria at Salonika',
vol. 4, Medical services during the operations on the 9 January 1917, WO 32/5112, PRO.
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as J W W Stephens, and sceptics like Sir Ronald Ross.24 Even before the committee had
been appointed, Ross wrote to Sir Alfred Keogh, Director General of the Army Medical
Services, that "Experience shows that ifmosquitoes are left to abound as before, quinine,
even in very considerable prophylactic doses, merely has the effect ofkeeping down the
fever, while allowing the men tobecome infected".25 Although the committee decidedthat
quinine prophylaxis should continue in the most dangerous areas, it placed greater
emphasis on the need for drainage and mosquito destruction.26 This represented a major
professional victory for Ross, whose much vaunted "mosquito brigades" were to form the
basis ofmalaria control in the British Empire until the end ofthe Second World War.
Yet there were some British MOs who insisted that quinine prophylaxis could be
valuable as a routine measure, provided that a standardized dose was given regularly to
troops. In S R Christophers' opinion, everything depended on good discipline and expert
supervision.27 Indeed, it may well have been thatthe ineffectiveness ofprophylaxis during
the First World War (and before) was due as much to lax discipline as to the limitations of
quinine itself. Commanding officers generally took a relaxed view of such matters and
were sometimes reluctant to enforcequinineconsumption because ofits unpopularity with
troops. Thus, although General Allenby provided his force in Palestine with mosquito-
repellent ointments and nets, quinine prophylaxis was not compulsory and was left to the
discretion of unit commanders.28 In Mesopotamia an order was given to compel the
prophylactic use ofquininebut, as theAdvisory Committeereported in 1916, it was "more
honoured in the breach than the observance".29 Indian troops there were also exempted
from the general orderinsisting on the use ofmosquito nets, on the grounds thatthey were
unpopular with the sepoys, who had, in many cases, acquired an immunity to the disease.
In Macedonia, quininization oftroops and civilian "reservoirs ofinfection" was attempted
but was not strictly enforced, particularly in forward areas. BetweenJanuary andmid-May
1918 90 per cent of men in some units on the Struma Front had contracted malaria.30
Medical officers often complained that co-operation between medical and other
branches ofthe army was unsatisfactory. The military authorities in Macedoniaapparently
took little interest in promoting knowledge ofmalaria among the troops and attendance at
lectures on malaria prevention was optional.3' A British Medical Journal editorial of
March 1918 bemoaned the high incidence of malaria in Macedonia and pointed out that
several military operations had been postponed as a consequence. In 1918 alone, some
25,000 British malaria cases were invalided back to the UK. The British MedicalJournal
claimed that this "wastage" might have been avoided had the General Staff been better
24 On the pre-war controversy over quinine day, with 10 grains twice weekly in the most highly
prophylaxis and malaria prevention see Michael malarious areas, WO 32/5112, PRO.
Worboys, 'Manson, Ross, and colonial medical 27 Mesopotamia inquiries (September 1916 to
policy: tropical medicine in London and Liverpool, January 1917)final report, New Delhi, Govt.
1899-1914', in R MacLeod and M Lewis (eds), Printing, 1917, p. 15.
Disease, medicine, and empire: perspectives on 28 Luce, 'War experiences', p. 530, RAMC 2031,
western medicine and the experience ofEuropean CMAC.
expansion, London, Routledge, 1988, pp. 21-37; 29 Medical advisorycommittee, op. cit., note 17
Harrison, op. cit., note 8 above, pp. 158-62. above, p. 15.
25 Ross to Keogh, 29 February 1916, WO 30 Alport, op. cit., note 19 above, p. 135.
32/5112, PRO. 31 W G Willoughby and Louis Cassidy, Anti-
26 'MRC Report on ... malaria at Salonika': the malaria work in Macedonia among British troops,
committee recommended a dose of5-6 grains every London, H K Lewis, 1918.
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acquainted with the measures necessary for protection against malaria.32 The neglect of
anti-malaria discipline was also much criticized in France: quinine prophylaxis was
ordered in the French Army in 1916 but was neverenforced. Medical officers insisted that
this lapse had occurred because combatant officers were not sufficiently aware of the
dangers and of what could be done to prevent malaria. A "mission anti-paludique" was
sent to Macedonia the following year, with apparently successful results33 but such claims
must be treated with caution, given the great difficulty of maintaining anti-malaria
discipline on active service.
In East Africa the failure of senior commanders to make provisions for malaria
prevention had similarly tragic results. Indian troops hadbeen specially chosen for service
in East Africa since it was believed they had acquired a degree of immunity to diseases
like malaria. It was said that European troops did "not last long in Africa" and that the
newly-raised African regiments were not yet a match for the more experienced German
colonial troops.34 But this supposed immunity was barely apparent: from 8 January to 5
May 1917 there were over 38,000 admissions to hospital among the British-led force in
East Africa, an admission rate of206 per thousand. In fact imperial troops serving in East
Africa had a death rate which exceeded that in any other theatre ofthe war and by the end
of the year most of the Indian regiments had been decimated. "The majority", according
to General D A Scott (secretary to the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army), "were
now in very arduous active operations and their wastage is very serious owing to fever,
dysentery, casualties in action, exposure and other causes physical and mental peculiar to
the campaign....'35
But these heavy casualties were not due solely to the perils of climate and terrain.
Medical preparations for both the Indian and British East African forces were limited in
the extreme and the latter was not even provided with its own medical service until 1917.
Malaria surveys (routine in other theatres) were not compulsory in East Africa, nor was
the prophylactic use of quinine. As the normally anodyne Official history put it, "It is
evident that at this time the prevailing idea was the defeat of the enemy, no matter what
the cost in wastage from sickness".36 General Jan Smuts-GOC from February 1916 to
January 1917-rejected what he termed a "timid Fabian strategy" in favour of arduous
marches during which hunger, thirst and sickness were to be met with stoical endurance.
Such things were of little consequence, according to Smuts, when the success of a big
operation hung in the balance.37
However, the high losses suffered by Indian and African forces cannot be attributed to
the negligence of Smuts alone. In fact, the deputy GOC East Africa-General L J van
Deventer-requested that several IMS officers should be despatched to East Africa to
advise on medical arrangements for Indian troops.38 But such measures were no more than
32 Br. med. J., 1918, i: 346. 36 MacPherson and Mitchell (eds), op. cit., note
33 See Edmond et lttienne Sergent, L'Armee 19 above, p. 466.
d'orient de'ivr&e du paludisme, Paris, Librairie de 37 F S Grafford, Jan Smuts: a biography, London,
I'Academie de Medicine, 1932, pp. 41-5, 59, 77. George, 1946, pp. 129-30.
34 GOC East Africa to Chief ofImperial General 38 Viceroy to Secretary of State for India,
Staff, 20 July 1917, LUMIL/5n737, India Office 11 September 1917, L/MIL/5n737, IOR.
Records (IOR).
35 Scott to Robertson, 14 November 1917,
L/MILJ5/737, IOR.
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a palliative since the real need, as General Scott pointed out, was for the replacement of
disease-ridden regiments with fresh troops from India (the 12,000 white South African
troops serving in East Africa had already been withdrawn). "All Indian units here", he
urged, "should be given a period of complete rest in a suitable climate and surroundings
with special medical supervision, good food, ample milk, fresh vegetables, comfortable
clothing, and these cannot be secured in East Africa." His own preference was to decamp
to Nairobi, where the climate and accommodation were more congenial.39 General van
Deventer was of like mind, pointing out that the frontier unrest which had kept many
regiments tied to India had been settled, there now being no good reason why Indian
troops in East Africa should not be relieved.40 Yet the Commander-in-Chief in India still
refused "on account of the excessive wastage amongst Indian troops which occurs there
and of the shortness in India of trained men to form the nucleus of a trained battalion.
Briefly ... we believe that Indian troops are unsuited for service in East Africa and could
be profitably employed elsewhere".41 This was no doubt good news for the regiments still
in India but for those in East Africa it was little short of a death sentence.
The failure to control malaria in East Africa drew a good deal of criticism in Britain:
questions were asked in the House of Commons about sickness among troops and
reassurances sought from the Under-Secretary for War.42 The British Medical Journal also
stressed the urgent need for anti-malaria discipline and the education of troops in
preventive measures. Its editor was particularly concerned about the ordinary soldier's
"prejudice" against quinine and his apparent reluctance to use mosquito nets.43 Medical
provisions in East Africa improved slowly-probably as a result of these protests-but it
was a case oftoo little too late. Malaria control was taken seriously only in the laterphases
of military operations, by which time the troops were already saturated with infection.44
The Second World War
At the outbreak of the Second World War, most medical officers still endorsed Ross's
view that quinine could only suppress, not prevent, malarial infection. Consequently, the
interwar literature on malaria prevention in the British and Imperial forces had been
concerned almost entirely with mosquito destruction and drainage45 and MOs were
advised not to rely too heavily on "suppressive treatment", as the preventive use of
quinine was now termed. A memorandum issued to British forces in the Middle East in
1942 stated that suppression was an emergency measure, to be contemplated only when
other measures were impracticable.46 In many theatres of the war, supplies of quinine
were, in any case, intermittent, especially when an army was in retreat.47
39 Scott to Robertson, 14 November 1917, London, HMSO, c.1923, vol. 1, P. 255.
UMIL/5/737, IOR. 45 For example G Covell, Anti-mosquito measures
40 Van Deventer to Robertson, 20 July 1917, with special reference to India, Calcutta, Govt. of
L/MIL/5/737, IOR. India Central Publications Branch, 1931.
41 Commander-in-Chief, India, to Robertson, 46 'Memorandum on the clinical aspects of
16 July 1917, L/MIL/5/737, IOR. malaria in the Middle East', GHQ, Middle East
42 See for example, Hansard, Parl. debates, Forces, May 1942, p. 41, RAMC 2063/34, CMAC.
19 July 1917; question from Mr Molteno, MP. 47 'Medicine injungle warfare', reprint from
43 Br med. J., 1916, i: 100. Procs. r Soc. Med., March 1945, 38: 195-8, RAMC
44 W G MacPherson, W P Herringham, T R 1939, CMAC.
Elliott, and A Balfour, Medical diseases ofthe war,
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In 1942, following the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies, the main source of
quinine was closed to the Allies and attention began to turn to synthetic substitutes. One
such substitute was mepacrine (also known as atebrin); a substance which had been
synthesized by German chemists in the early 1930s. Successful field trials aroused
German hopes that it would give their forces the edge in any war in Africa or the
Mediterranean. But the Germans had sold the secrets of the new drug to the Americans
and, although this information omitted vital details, it had allowed the Americans and the
British to synthesize small quantities of mepacrine before the war began. With the entry
ofAmerica into the war in 1941, and the fall ofJava to the Japanese in the following year,
British, American and Dominion chemists stepped up production of the drug, which was
made available to front-line units from 1942.48
But mepacrine prophylaxis initially fared no better than quinine. After being used in
West and North Africa in 1942-3, its use was discontinued in some areas because of its
allegedly toxic side effects.49 However, some MOs claimed that the real problem was not
mepacrine itself but the continuing hostility of combatant offlcers and men. The
replacement of quinine with mepacrine had failed to scotch rumours circulating in both
the British and Indian armies regarding anti-malarial drugs and sexual impotence.
Suspicion of anti-malarial drugs was also heightened in India by reports of the death of
twelve soldiers in the Eastern Army as a result of the intravenous injection of large
"therapeutic" doses ofquinine.50
Such reservations were not easily dispelled, despite considerable effort on the part of
the military authorities. In North Africa during 1942, the British forces' newspaper Union
Jack conducted a long educational campaign among British troops which stressed their
responsibilities towards their comrades in arms. "Every soldier", it insisted, "should be
aware that in becoming a malaria casualty, through neglect of [anti-malarial] precautions
he is wilfully endangering his healthy neighbour because of his own infection".51
Neglecting to take one's mepacrine amounted to a crime against one's fellows: "Any
soldier who steals from a comrade has sunk pretty low", declared the Union Jack, "Yet
that is exactly what scores are doing right now in this theatre of war. . . . Through
thoughtless stupidity and not through malice. But that doesn't let them out."52 In India,
too, instructions urged that "Strong disciplinary action should be taken against those who
fail to carry out routine prophylactic measures during the malaria season. Failure to
observe such measures is tantamount to self-inflicted injury".53
The invasion ofSicily in the summer of 1943, during which over 20,000 British troops
were admitted to hospital with malaria, showed that such appeals had had little effect.
Many officers failed to take any precautions against malaria and numerous cases occurred
among the British force even before it had left North Africa (almost 500 men were left
48 Papers of Sir Ernest Covell: circular letter on 51 Union Jack, 22 April 1942, RAMC 651/3,
the health ofthe army in North Africa in 1942, p. 8, CMAC.
RAMC 466/38, CMAC. 52 Union Jack, 13 August 1942, RAMC 651/3,
49 Maj. J Reid, 'Studies on the pharmacology of CMAC.
mepacrine', p. 1, RAMC 2065, CMAC. 53 'The prevention ofmalaria', pamphlet issued to
50 Col G F Taylor, 'Some medical problems of the NCOs and men in India, 1941, RAMC 762/4,
Eastern Army', Proceedings ofthe conference of CMAC.
medical specialists ofEastern Army, March 1943,
Calcutta, Govt. of India Press, 1943, pp. 7-10.
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behind by the 7th Army alone). In Sicily the situation was even worse: malaria units did
not arrive until very late in the day and mepacrine suppression was never enforced.54 Nor
were the troops encouraged by their officers to use mosquito nets or insect repellents, as
both were generally unpopular.55 Troops hadbeen instructed in malariaprevention but too
much of their training was theoretical. The military authorities also made a number of
errors and misjudgements, some of which had lasting consequences: troops were issued
with shorts which left their legs exposed to mosquito bites in the evening; instructions
regarding mepacrine suppression were misleading, giving the impression that the drug
was to be taken for five weeks only; an older and more greasy type of protective cream
was issued, instead of the newer one that had been authorized. According to Lt-Col A S
Thompson, the latter error was "the origin of a prejudice against repellents of any kind,
which lingered to the end of the war. Men who had been in Sicily swore that "anti-
mosquito cream" actually attracted mosquitoes".56
But an even more fundamental obstacle stood in the way of malaria control: the
indifference and even hostility to anti-malaria precautions displayed by those in positions
of responsibility. The Deputy Director of Hygiene for the Middle Eastern Command
declared that "junior officers and seniorN.C.Os. set aparticularly bad example as regards
individual measures ofprotection.... It was also very clearthat formation staffs were not
blameless.... It was widely reported that one area commander was notorious for his
disregard of personal anti-malaria precautions".57 Such neglect left a legacy which
contributed to the high incidence ofmalaria that persisted into the first three weeks ofthe
campaign in mainland Italy. From 4 September to 27 November there were no less than
15,547 cases of malaria and Not Yet Diagnosed Fevers admitted to medical units of the
8th Army; at least 8,000 ofwhich were attributed to infection in Sicily.58
The urgent need to stem the drain on manpower caused by malaria in,Italy and the
Eastern Theatre led, in 1943, to the formation ofthe Australian Army Medical Research
Units, based at Cairns and Atherton in Northern Queensland. At Cairns, under Brigadier
N Hamilton Fairley, volunteers were subjected to bites from mosquitoes infected with
malaria and treated with various anti-malarial drugs. At Atherton, a non-malarious area,
scientists investigated whether patients infected at Cairns had been cured, or still
harboured parasites in their blood. Among the drugs tested were sulphamerazine,
mepacrine, and a new compound, paluride, which did not come into general use until after
the war.59
The Cairns work, together with research carried out at the Royal Army Medical
College, Millbank, showed that mepacrine was not toxic if taken in small doses6O and
subsequent use was to reveal that semi-serious side effects, such as dermatitis, occurred in
54 'Memo. on anti-malarial discipline', RAMC 57 Ibid., p. 7.
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pp. 183-4. 60 Maj. J Reid, 'Studies on the pharmacology of
56 Lt-Col A W S Thompson, 'Malaria control in mepacrine', RAMC 2065, CMAC.
mobile warfare-Italian campaign 1943-45',
pp. 5-6, WO 222/159, PRO.
446Malaria Control in the British Army
only a small number of cases, although yellow staining of the skin was fairly
widespread.61 But the real value of this research, together with experience in the field,62
was that it demonstrated that mepacrine was effective against all forms of malaria. The
conclusion, accepted with some reserve by the General Staff, was that problems
encountered in malaria prevention were due not to any defect in the drug but to lapses in
anti-malarial discipline.63 Strict discipline, as a memorandum of 1944 put it, was now
identified as "the essence of successful anti-malarial measures".64
The truth of this maxim was amply demonstrated in both positive and negative senses
by developments in the last two years of the war. In 1945 Fairley observed approvingly
that the malaria rate among the Australian force in New Guinea had declined
progressively from 740 per 1000 in December 1943 to only 20 per 1000 by November
1944, despite the fact that troops were still stationed in hyper-endemic areas.65 He
believed that this improvement had been achieved by tightening mepacrine discipline and
by better education of combatants in malaria prevention. By the end of the war, the
Australian Army had come to regard knowledge of mepacrine administration and other
anti-malarial measures as "an essential part ofa soldier's training forjungle warfare", and
their implementation as "a matter of strict military discipline".66
Another striking illustration of what could be achieved through discipline was the
successful campaign against malaria in South East Asia. General Slim, commanding the
14th Army (a British, Indian, and African force), is generally remembered for repelling
the Japanese invasion ofArakan in 1944 and the reconquest ofBurma the following year.
Malaria control was to play acrucial part in the campaign, and, in his memoirs Defeat into
victory, Slim rated health as his most important problem after supply. In 1943 the malaria
rate averaged 60 per cent of the total strength of his Army, and was considerably higher
among forward troops. The Indian 6th Infantry Brigade operating in Arakan at the
beginning of 1943 suffered a 100 per cent infection rate,67 and in the last three months of
that year, some 18,000 British malaria cases were evacuated from India.68 Slim's solution
was to put pressure upon unit commanders. As he put it:
Good doctors are no use without good discipline. More than halfthe battle against disease is fought
not by doctors, but by regimental officers. It is they who see that the daily dose ofmepacrine ... is
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taken ... Ifmepacrine was not taken, I sacked the commander. I only had to sack three; by then the
rest had got my meaning.69
On the advice of the Consultant Malariologist, India Command, Major-General Sir
Gordon Covell, mepacrine suppression was enforced with vigour throughout Burma.
Covell had visited Cairns and New Guinea, and had seen the results of effective
suppression at first hand.70 Slim also had the support ofLord Mountbatten, who assumed
supreme command of Allied forces in South East Asia in 1943. Mountbatten took a
personal interest in medicine and began a vigorous onslaught on the Indian administration
to secure better medical provisions;71 although there remained some problems with the
supply ofmepacrine during mobile operations.72 Education in mepacrine suppression was
also stepped up, apparently with good effect. A report on malaria in the British force
during operations in Arakan from March to June 1943 claimed that "In spite of the usual
barrack-room rumours that the drug caused impotence, men came to place considerable
reliance on it, and infantrymen would come to the R.A.P. [Regimental Aid Post] for the
drug if they had missed it for any reason". The only problem was that the new regime
imposed by Slim, which involved daily parades at which the drug was distributed by
company, platoon and section commanders, was liable to be upset by active service.73
Despite these difficulties, Slim's determination to overcome the problem of malaria
gradually bore fruit. Admissions tohospital from malaria among British soldiers in Burma
decreased from a high of 60 per cent of total strength in 1943 to around 10 per cent in
1945. The death rate was also greatly reduced, and from May 1944 to November 1945 it
is claimed that there were only 6 deaths out of almost 14,000 cases.74 Some caution is
advisable when assessing these figures, foritis doubtful whethermany malaria cases were
in a position to be evacuated and therefore admitted to hospital. Yet it was clear to most
observers that improved anti-malarial discipline had given the Allies the edge in Burma.
Increasing confidence in malaria control enabled Mountbatten and Slim to continue their
advance through the monsoon, when the malaria season was at its height.75 The Japanese,
by contrast, were gravely weakened by malaria, and blood samples obtained from
captured Japanese soldiers revealed rates of infection ranging from around 30 to 49 per
cent.76 The supply of medicines and other vital equipment to the Japanese Army had
broken down and anti-malaria discipline lapsed as the army retreated.77
Anti-malaria discipline undeniably gave the Allies a comparative advantage over the
Japanese but it is necessary to qualify some of the more extravagant claims made by
medical officers after the event. The DGAMS of the Indian Army, for example, gave
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credence to the popular beliefthat Slim and Mountbatten had deliberately chosen as their
battleground the most malarious areas of Burma in the knowledge that their medical
services were infinitely superior to those of the Japanese. Slim denied this in his
autobiography and disclosed that he was still far from confident about his army's
precautions against malaria. It was this lingering doubt about the success of the anti-
malaria campaign that led Slim to chose East African troops to lead the force into the
Kabaw Valley, on account of their (supposedly) greater immunity to the disease. He
further maintained that any superiority his medical service may have enjoyed was not due
to any greater professionalism on its part but merely to the fact that the Japanese Army
was starved of supplies and in disarray from its hasty retreat.78
Although theresults ofmepacrine suppression were impressive, malariacontrol was not
simply a matter ofpersonal protection. Where conditions permitted, mosquito eradication
measures of various kinds were implemented, including traditional methods such as the
oiling of breeding pools, as well as the use of insecticide sprays more appropriate to
mobile warfare. Between the wars, the insecticide Paris Green (first used against the
Colorado beetle in the USA) came to be employed against mosquitoes in the British
colonies.79 However, in the years immediately before the war, pyrethrum-based
insecticides took pride of place. The only drawback with pyrethrum was that it was
extracted from flowers which grew mostly in Dalmatia and Japan, and at the outbreak of
war the Allies were left with Kenya as the sole supplier. Since Kenyan supplies were
insufficient, a substitute had to be found and this came in the form of
dichlorodiphenyltrichloroephane (DDT), first synthesized by a German chemist in 1874.
The insecticidal properties ofDDT were not discovered until 1939, after which tests were
conducted in the USA and in Britain to determine its uses and its toxicity. Even then, there
was some delay before the substance was being used in the field and the first large-scale
use ofDDT did not occur until the beginning of 1944, during the Naples typhus epidemic.
Subsequently, field trials which tested the efficacy of DDT against mosquitoes were
conducted in India and in the South West Pacific by US forces.80
The success of these trials led to the widespread use of DDT in malaria control and it
was to prove especially important in Italy, where as a result ofwar damage and deliberate
sabotage by the Germans large areas of reclaimed coastal land had been flooded. The
Germans had also sabotaged the canals draining land north of Naples, as well as the
drainage system ofthe Pontine Marshes, which lay in front ofthe Allies as they advanced
towards Rome. It seemed as ifmalaria was being used consciously as a weapon ofwar.81
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However, the expected epidemic among both civilians and soldiers never occurred. This
was due, in part, to the improvement ofanti-malarial discipline afterthe Sicilian campaign
and partly to the use ofDDT, which kept malaria under control outside ofmilitary camps.
A Malaria Control Branch was set up underColonel Paul Russell ofthe US Army Medical
Corps to act in an advisory capacity to the Allied armies and civilian public health bodies.
Russell and his colleagues showed that DDT could be used both as a larvicide and in the
destruction of adult mosquitoes, and that it could be sprayed by hand or by aircraft; the
latter being particularly useful in flooded areas like the Pontine Marshes. It was also
discovered that buildings sprayed with DDT remained lethal to adult mosquitoes for up to
two months. This was ofgreat importance from a military point ofview, for it provided a
method of control which enabled fast-moving forces to be protected in forward areas.82
Combined with suppressive treatment with mepacrine and more vigorous propagandizing,
these measures reduced the malaria rate in the Central Mediterranean Force from 76 per
1000 in 1944, to 19 per 1000 in 1945.83
DDT also figured prominently in malaria control in Burma. Anti-Malaria Units had
formerly been dependent upon the insecticide Paris Green and upon drainage works, where
these were practicable. The units had been fairly successful in keeping malaria in check
around the base camps but they had been unable to confer much protection on troops in
forward areas.84 By the time ofthe Slim's invasion ofBurma, the spraying ofDDT from the
airwas common and specially-adapted Hurricane fighters covered large tracts oflandpriorto
the advance of Allied troops. A classic example was the spraying of the Kabaw Valley
(literally, "valley of death"), which was said to be "one of the most unhealthy areas in the
world" because oftheprevalence ofboth scrubtyphus andmalaria. Allied troops hadtomove
through this area immediately after the monsoon of 1945 but spraying kept sickness to a
minimum.85 Such achievements led some MOs to anticipate the eradication of malaria but
success brought its own problems. A report on the medical history of the Burma campaign
recorded "a growing tendency in Units to consider that D.D.T. abolished the necessity for
observance of 100% hygiene standards". "Such wasthepublicity", thereportclaimed, "it was
thought D.D.T. would convert a hopelessly insanitary area into a health resort."86
And it was true that there were still officers and men who paid little heed to medical
advice. A case in point is Special Force (better known as the "Chindits") which operated
behind Japanese lines in Burma. Suppressive treatment with mepacrine and other personal
measures were the only feasible means ofprotecting the long-range penetration columns of
Special Force against malaria. But, according to the ChiefMO, Colonel William J Officer,
its columns were not supplied with mepacrine, protective clothing, insect repellent, or nets,
until very late in the day. Even then, these articles were not always put to effective use.
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"Antimalarial discipline", he lamented, "was of a very low standard"; a fact which he put
downpartly to the ordinary soldier's suspicion ofmepacrine andpartly to abeliefon thepart
of some officers that it reduced fighting efficiency.87 In addition, there was a deeply
ingrained distrust ofMOs: according to Captain J S Dawson, "the habit oflooking upon the
doctor as a Fifth Columnist, likely to blab the merest piece of confidential information
vouchsafed to him, is still all too prevalent".88 But education in malaria prevention was not
totally without success. One MO reported that mepacrine was popular with the troops in his
column and that they took care to store it up, as with ammunition.89
Colonel Officerbelieved thatthe neglect ofmalaria control in Special Force was chiefly the
faultofitscommander-Major-General OrdeWingate. Wingatehad an undisguised contempt
for medicine and medical officers: like some Victorian commanders, he believed that MOs
knew little about warfare and regarded them as little more than an encumbrance on active
service. Colonel Officer's predecessor claimed that "the Medical Branch had to fight at every
stage for even the smallest concession to the medical care of the troops" and spoke of
Wmgate's "antipathy to all things medical". On their first meeting, Wingate told him frankly
thathedidnotwantanything medical withhis columns butthathewould acquiesce in adoctor
foreach "forthe sakeofthe moral effect on the families athome". He wantedevery man with
his force to be a fighting man, with "no passengers nor Geneva Convention people".90 It was
alleged that Wingate remained wilfully ignorant ofthe condition ofhis men,91 despite reports
that malaria was sapping the morale and fighting efficiency ofthe force.
The contrast between medical provisions in Slim's 14th Army and Wingate's Chindits
could not be more striking. These differences may be attributed partly to the nature ofthe
campaign: operating behind the lines; the Chindits did not have the benefit of either
mosquito brigades or aerial spraying with DDT. The areas in which they fought were also
intensely malarious and even where mepacrine suppression was rigorously enforced,
levels of infection were such that the dosage had to be increased considerably, and not
always with great success.92 But Wingate cannot escape responsibility for the high
sickness rate in his force: he was clearly antagonistic towards MOs and did nothing to
encourage an interest in malaria prevention among his officers or men. Indeed, Wingate
was heavily criticized for his neglect ofmedical arrangements by an official report issued
in 1945.93 Slim, by contrast, was the very model ofthe new professional soldier: strict yet
compassionate, and keen to apply the principles of "man-management" and "manpower
economy". He was also ready to take advice from experts, whereas Wingate was
imperious and refused to listen to or to defer to anyone.94 Wingate was convinced that
victory could be gained only by sacrifice and, like an Old Testament prophet, promised
doom and oblivion to all those who served under him.95
87 'Special Force. Report on the medical aspects 91 Ibid., p.3.
ofoperations for the period 1943-4', by the DDMS, 92 'Special Force', pt 6, p. 10, RAMC 816,
Col W J Officer, pt 4, pp. 8-10, RAMC 816, CMAC. CMAC.
88 'Report by Capt J S Donovan', RAMC 816, 93 'Report on medical provisions for the Burma
CMAC. Field Force, 1943-45', RAMC 2021, CMAC.
89 'Some observations of a column medical 94 Shelford Bidwell, The Chindit war: the
officer', RAMC 816, CMAC. campaign in Burma, 1944, London, Book Club
90 'Notes on the Report by the former DDMS', Associates, 1979, p. 39.
RAMC 816, CMAC. 95 Ibid., pp. 24, 39, 41, 62.
451Mark Harrison
Conclusion
The campaign in Burma serves to underline the point that success in malaria control-
as in other areas of military medicine-depended crucially upon the value attached to
medicine by commanders in the field. Although the link between medicine and military
efficiency was clearly perceived by generals such as Wolseley in the nineteenth century,
the British Army was slow to incorporate medicine into military planning. The situation
began tochange during the First World War, as manpower shortages provided an incentive
to cut down on "wastage" from disease, but it was clear that medical officers were often
excluded from military decision-making and that medicine was given a low priority by
headquarters staff (away from the Western Front, at least).
During the Second World War a new generation of senior commanders such as Slim,
inured to principles of manpower economy and with personal experience of the Army's
medical failures in the First World War, came to attach much greater importance to
medical provisions for troops. This new style of command was a crucial factor in the
BritishArmy's relative success againstmalariaafter 1943; as it was inotherAlliedarmies.
The success of mepacrine suppression depended on a readiness to impose discipline on
regimental officers, while the successful use of DDT depended on closer co-operation
between medical and combatant branches of the army. But discipline and planning are
only part ofthe story: a concerted effort was made to educate troops in malariaprevention
and to make personal precautions a matter ofmilitary honour. Soldiers were instructed in
malariaprevention during the First World War but these attempts were often half-hearted,
forthere was little faith in the ordinary soldier's capacity foreducation and self-discipline.
During the Second World War, by contrast, it was made clear that the prevention of
malaria was as much the responsibility of the soldier as of the medical officer. Although
this new faith in the British soldier was notentirelyjustified in view ofthe neglect ofanti-
malaria precautions in Sicily and North Africa, there is some evidence to suggest that
mepacrine may have been growing in popularity by the end of the war and that malaria
prevention was becoming a standard feature ofmilitary training.
Paradoxically, the greater ability of armies to control malaria during the Second World
War made the disease a more important factorin military operations. Whereas, previously,
opposing forces had usually been affected by the disease in equal proportion, it was now
possible for an army which took malaria control seriously to gain a comparative
advantage; a feature ofthe Second World War which is clearly illustratedby the campaign
in South East Asia. F A E Crew, the official medical historian of the Burma campaign,
went so far as to suggest that the marked difference in malaria rates in the opposing forces
was "one ofthe most important reasons why the Japanese weredefeated".96 There is some
truth in this but it is important to note that the medical advantage enjoyed by the Allies at
this stage of the war owed as much to the military situation as it did to medical
intervention and anti-malaria discipline, and particularly to the fact that Japanese supply
lines had been disrupted by the retreat oftheir army and by superior Allied air-power. As
Slim readily acknowledged, if the situation had been reversed, his army's medical
advantage would have quickly disappeared.
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